With the current rancor about Washington, DC's budget autonomy, I wanted to weigh in on a different but related point. I don't necessarily think that the Free City Model is the best idea for increasing DC's budget autonomy, rather than statehood or other proposals. What I hope this post can address is the potential benefits of using the free city model and the increased potential for Washington, DC as a laboratory of democracy, to use the overused phrase.
There is a large consensus within the economics literature that the programs that affect the least well-off often do not do well by them. From zoning restrictions that limit how dense a city may become (and therefore how many low-income and non-working people can afford to live there) to permitting requirements that artificially increase the cost of opening and maintaining a business. Or occupational licensing that artificially raises the price of entering multiple professions. Mercatus estimates that each regulation costs each worker about $13,000 each year.
Economics also shows that in addition to regulations removing opportunities for people in poverty, the programs that we have designed to support those who experience poverty and disability--the social welfare system--does a relatively poor job at 1) reaching those in need 2) providing responsive and individualized support 3) respecting the dignity and worth of the participant 4) coordinating across agencies to present a coherent system 5) helping people achieve their plans for a better life.
It's from this last point that I draw most of my affection for this idea because it's where my research and policy knowledge lies. I think of how different policy advocacy would be if we had the ability to radically change systems in the interest of our target populations. I understand that on the federal level, this is still possible. FAP wasn't long ago. Participant-Directed Medicaid is federally-driven. But in the aggregate, federal policy changes on the largest social welfare programs inch gradually, with some fluctuation, to lower efficiency, cost shifting onto participants, and more stringent regulation.
What I believe the free city model would offer me as a policy advocate is a higher likelihood of implementing policies I believe to best help individuals experiencing poverty. Basic income will not happen in the current system unless Milton Friedman's reanimated corpse runs for president (I'd vote for him). But under a free city model that allows significant autonomy, a highly informed populous with high incomes could provide a fertile ground for evidence-based policy to take hold.
Washington, DC is in a unique space. It is an incredibly liberal town that legalized gay marriage as well as medical and recreational marijuana at the outset of these movements. It's population includes some of the highest informed individuals as well as a significant divide between the people with money and the people without money, who are slowly being pushed out of the city.
Washington, DC also retains a degree of autonomy that is currently under debate. As Eleanor Holmes Norton chastises her colleagues, there is a policy problem that is ripe for a good solution. For those on the right, Free Cities have been a source of inspiration and study for the last decade. The ideas for Free Cities undergird the Seasteading Institute and have been implemented (after lengthy litigation) in Central America and throughout the world. The promise of a low-tax, highly efficient city would work well for senators on the right side of the aisle who are pro-economic freedom.
While the model of free cities imposes free market capitalism by appointed technocracy (because somehow that's less corrupt than democracy?), there is no reason that Washington DC couldn't go on using their existing, functional city government. Relax federal restrictions and allow the municipality to adopt the same federal codes or make changes that they feel might make more sense for their locality. Continue paying the same amount of funds in, but allow local control to a greater extent.
I don't know. Just a thought.
Wednesday, May 25, 2016
Tuesday, November 10, 2015
How Tiebout Competition Helped Me Fall out of Love with Public Choice (but still use it)
I got into it a little bit with a moderator at a Mercatus panel. It was actually pretty rewarding. It was the only thing I was really passionate about the whole seminar, since it had to do with how to best help people with low income. The argument was over competitive federalism--the idea that states and localities within a federal system compete for the best people to move there. Now, this notion (termed Tiebout competition) is undoubtedly true in many cases. As anyone who is my age and planning to move localities will tell you, everyone and your parents tell you that you need to look at school districts and tax burden for any place you might move. Indeed, it is often said that the middle and upper class already have "school choice," since they have the capital, information, and incentive to move to other jurisdictions where schools or taxes might be better. (Incidentally, this seminar did do a great job of pointing out why New Jersey is awful for taxes but unevenly good for schools.)
Anyway, the problem I raise with Tiebout competition is that its benefits are uneven. The author, David Greve, argues that competition between states and localities presents only winners--all people will benefit from competition for localities. I asked if there were any people who systematically gain from cartel federalism--competitive federalism's antithesis that reduces competition and movement between places--and therefore lose out under competitive federalism. I didn't really have an answer, and my mind wasn't directed towards the problems in Tiebout competition, really. I genuinely wanted help thinking through the context of competitive federalism and what conditions might make participants in this system better or worse off.
The moderator challenged the idea that people with low-income aren't mobile. He pointed to great migrations from the South in the 30s and 40s for individuals looking for better work as well as people immigrating from Cuba and Florida. I challenged the idea that these are equivalent scenarios to moving localities due to fiscal policy issues. A person moving from DC to NoVA is not the same as people facing the threat of death and moving from totalitarian Cuba or the pre-Civil Rights Era South.
As I've been able to think about it more, the more convinced I am that public choice has a significant problem. Tiebout competition is completely inattentive to context. A person who is graduating from a Master's program and looking for a first job to start a family can engage in voting with his feet. A person on disability with a chronic health condition cannot pack up and move because their locality or state has pension debt that will absolutely cripple it financially for the next few decades. First of all, they don't have the information on where to move. If they do have any information about where to move, it is about social networks and capital within a potential new environment--not the detailed (perfect?) economic and political information they would need to have in Tiebout's model.
Though information problems are real for this person, they are actually almost entirely irrelevant since the incentives are so terrible for this person to move. He's on Medicaid in DC, most likely. He will not be eligible for Medicaid in Virginia because Virginia very high Medicaid eligibility requirements. Even if he were for some reason eligible, he would have to wait three months at minimum to get hooked up with Medicaid through Virginia's system. He'll have to get new doctors and other services. So, he's not moving if he has a chronic health condition. If he's on a housing voucher, forget it. He's not moving. That doesn't follow anyone and waiting lists in most localities range from a few months (in sparsely populated areas) to decades (in many well-populated areas). SNAP benefits will port most easily, but these benefits are very small for a single adult ($200/month). These are just social welfare incentives. This says nothing about social, cultural, or other reasons this person have for staying in his home city. Seriously, and poor people are going to leave because of fiscal insolvency?
What we can see is that these individuals are not able to take advantage of "voting with their feet" since the caretlized system prevents them from porting their benefits from one location to another. Greve has a solution to this, and it is to make Medicaid a federally-run program. I'm actually quite sympathetic to this argument. First, while the left is conceptually wrong to posit positive rights to health care, they are correct that social welfare is in our current system best granted by a federal government (preferably on the constitutional level). They are right because putting social welfare at the federal level provides a more level playing field for social welfare participants. It at least assures a floor (however tenuous). Basic income and consumer-directed Medicaid at the federal level (which we don't have but should) would give people more capital and better incentives to move from jurisdiction to jurisdiction in search of the best deal--even those with low or very low income.
But that gets me back to my original question--who loses out on a switch to competitive federalism. Undoubtedly, there are individuals like the man in our case example who have been able to garner benefits that provide him with a minimal standard of living. We can also be assured that there are a minority of social welfare participants who have been able to gain benefits so they can live comfortably and with a good standard of living. You know those public housing buildings that are oddly in nice parts of town? People live in there. Who loses in the transition to a more competitive system? People who are winning under the current flawed system will lose on some of their captured benefits when the system finds a new equilibrium point that is more equitable for all social welfare participants. Many might find that their now privately-owned housing may be more expensive than their basic income would allow. Or that Greve's voucher-for-private-insurance healthcare system would not actually help someone with chronic home health care needs. That person needs tens of thousands of dollars in services, and it would be clear from looking at their medical records for a second. No private insurer is signing on to fund that.
To be sure, social welfare under competitive federalism would have its benefits. People with proper funding can leave existing relationships that are no longer satisfactory--be they marriages, jobs, or yes, governments. However, under our current system, not everyone can participate in voting with their feet equally. And while bringing us closer to a federal social welfare system focused on cash or near-cash benefits would help things, there are definitely people within the system that will lose. Not attending to that context or having a plan for what to do with these people (who through no fault of their own disproportionately benefit at the expense of newer or potential social welfare participants) is just bad social policy.
Anyway, the problem I raise with Tiebout competition is that its benefits are uneven. The author, David Greve, argues that competition between states and localities presents only winners--all people will benefit from competition for localities. I asked if there were any people who systematically gain from cartel federalism--competitive federalism's antithesis that reduces competition and movement between places--and therefore lose out under competitive federalism. I didn't really have an answer, and my mind wasn't directed towards the problems in Tiebout competition, really. I genuinely wanted help thinking through the context of competitive federalism and what conditions might make participants in this system better or worse off.
The moderator challenged the idea that people with low-income aren't mobile. He pointed to great migrations from the South in the 30s and 40s for individuals looking for better work as well as people immigrating from Cuba and Florida. I challenged the idea that these are equivalent scenarios to moving localities due to fiscal policy issues. A person moving from DC to NoVA is not the same as people facing the threat of death and moving from totalitarian Cuba or the pre-Civil Rights Era South.
As I've been able to think about it more, the more convinced I am that public choice has a significant problem. Tiebout competition is completely inattentive to context. A person who is graduating from a Master's program and looking for a first job to start a family can engage in voting with his feet. A person on disability with a chronic health condition cannot pack up and move because their locality or state has pension debt that will absolutely cripple it financially for the next few decades. First of all, they don't have the information on where to move. If they do have any information about where to move, it is about social networks and capital within a potential new environment--not the detailed (perfect?) economic and political information they would need to have in Tiebout's model.
Though information problems are real for this person, they are actually almost entirely irrelevant since the incentives are so terrible for this person to move. He's on Medicaid in DC, most likely. He will not be eligible for Medicaid in Virginia because Virginia very high Medicaid eligibility requirements. Even if he were for some reason eligible, he would have to wait three months at minimum to get hooked up with Medicaid through Virginia's system. He'll have to get new doctors and other services. So, he's not moving if he has a chronic health condition. If he's on a housing voucher, forget it. He's not moving. That doesn't follow anyone and waiting lists in most localities range from a few months (in sparsely populated areas) to decades (in many well-populated areas). SNAP benefits will port most easily, but these benefits are very small for a single adult ($200/month). These are just social welfare incentives. This says nothing about social, cultural, or other reasons this person have for staying in his home city. Seriously, and poor people are going to leave because of fiscal insolvency?
What we can see is that these individuals are not able to take advantage of "voting with their feet" since the caretlized system prevents them from porting their benefits from one location to another. Greve has a solution to this, and it is to make Medicaid a federally-run program. I'm actually quite sympathetic to this argument. First, while the left is conceptually wrong to posit positive rights to health care, they are correct that social welfare is in our current system best granted by a federal government (preferably on the constitutional level). They are right because putting social welfare at the federal level provides a more level playing field for social welfare participants. It at least assures a floor (however tenuous). Basic income and consumer-directed Medicaid at the federal level (which we don't have but should) would give people more capital and better incentives to move from jurisdiction to jurisdiction in search of the best deal--even those with low or very low income.
But that gets me back to my original question--who loses out on a switch to competitive federalism. Undoubtedly, there are individuals like the man in our case example who have been able to garner benefits that provide him with a minimal standard of living. We can also be assured that there are a minority of social welfare participants who have been able to gain benefits so they can live comfortably and with a good standard of living. You know those public housing buildings that are oddly in nice parts of town? People live in there. Who loses in the transition to a more competitive system? People who are winning under the current flawed system will lose on some of their captured benefits when the system finds a new equilibrium point that is more equitable for all social welfare participants. Many might find that their now privately-owned housing may be more expensive than their basic income would allow. Or that Greve's voucher-for-private-insurance healthcare system would not actually help someone with chronic home health care needs. That person needs tens of thousands of dollars in services, and it would be clear from looking at their medical records for a second. No private insurer is signing on to fund that.
To be sure, social welfare under competitive federalism would have its benefits. People with proper funding can leave existing relationships that are no longer satisfactory--be they marriages, jobs, or yes, governments. However, under our current system, not everyone can participate in voting with their feet equally. And while bringing us closer to a federal social welfare system focused on cash or near-cash benefits would help things, there are definitely people within the system that will lose. Not attending to that context or having a plan for what to do with these people (who through no fault of their own disproportionately benefit at the expense of newer or potential social welfare participants) is just bad social policy.
Saturday, August 22, 2015
A Summary of the Arguments Against Social Work Licensure
For a long time now, I've wanted to write a journal article critically engaging with the existing state of social work licensure laws and what I perceive to be their negative effects on social work practitioners and consumers. Before I start wading into the literature (this will be my next theoretical article after the two I'm working on now), I wanted to summarize what I believe to be the main arguments against the status quo. I'm hoping to get it out soon to capitalize on the White House's report on occupational licensure.
1) Prices
Licensure laws, by restricting access to market for producers, serve to increase prices for social work services. This benefit is not distributed evenly across social workers. Older, more established social workers are best protected by this law, as they have been grandfathered into or already earned their license and have accrued a reputation in their practice area. Newer social work licensees, on the other hand, will be less able to undercut their prices and enter into a market. Additionally, by setting an artificially high price floor for the services of clinical social workers, consumers (and insurers) are less able to negotiate lower rates or force practitioners to compete on price. This is particularly problematic for consumers who use consumer-directed or self-directed social welfare programs to pay for social work services.
Questions:
- What does the literature say on health professional licensing and prices for services?
- What empirical and theoretical foundations can I rely on?
2) Lack of evidence
I haven't done a thorough and proper literature search, but I'm willing to bet that the empirical evidence for social work licensure is slim to non-existant. The main arguments for licensure involve client protection, but are their studies that show that stricter licensure requirements are associated with fewer malpractice cases? I'm willing to bet there are not. I may even have to request this data.
Questions:
- Has anyone ever studied this before?
- What does data from other health professions say about licensure?
- What was the state of social work licensure before the ASWB model law?
- Would it be worth requesting this data, performing a regression, and publishing it?
3) Access to social work profession
The cost of getting a social work license is prohibitively high for individuals of low income. In order to start practicing independently, social workers must earn a masters degree, pass one or more licensing exams, and engage in supervised practice for 1-3 years (depending on the state). Masters degrees at state schools are at least in the tens of thousands of dollars. It's not like there are many endowed social work departments to offer scholarships and fellowships. The licensing process itself costs a few hundred dollars to process your paperwork. And clinical supervision is often an additional weekly cost over the course of 1-3 years (we've probably paid 7-8 thousand dollars). Finally, in order to maintain your license, you need to be able to pay for continuing education units throughout the year.
Questions:
- How much does social work licensure cost in each state?
- How much does an MSW cost, on average?
- How do these vary by state?
- How much does clinical supervision cost in each state?
- How much do CEUs cost on average? How do most social workers get their CEUs?
4) It fucks over the young
Social work licensure is a game that is dominated by existing practitioners. Given that social work licensure used to be far more laissez-faire and college tuition costs have risen exponentially, older social workers are less likely to have faced such steep costs when they became practitioners. Newer practitioners face steep costs that limit their ability to have enough capital to start their own businesses or form their own cooperatives. Instead, many recent graduates will work as part of large organizations of social workers and counselors under the supervision of a few more experienced practitioners. Older practitioners are also the individuals providing supervised practice and leading CEU courses and trainings for a considerable cost. Newer practitioners are forced to pay these individuals in order to credential themselves. Existing laws do not protect potential social workers, they protect existing social workers.
Questions:
- What were social work laws like prior to the 2000s?
- More of the cost stuff
- What is some theoretical literature that supports the idea that licensure laws impact newer competitors?
1) Prices
Licensure laws, by restricting access to market for producers, serve to increase prices for social work services. This benefit is not distributed evenly across social workers. Older, more established social workers are best protected by this law, as they have been grandfathered into or already earned their license and have accrued a reputation in their practice area. Newer social work licensees, on the other hand, will be less able to undercut their prices and enter into a market. Additionally, by setting an artificially high price floor for the services of clinical social workers, consumers (and insurers) are less able to negotiate lower rates or force practitioners to compete on price. This is particularly problematic for consumers who use consumer-directed or self-directed social welfare programs to pay for social work services.
Questions:
- What does the literature say on health professional licensing and prices for services?
- What empirical and theoretical foundations can I rely on?
2) Lack of evidence
I haven't done a thorough and proper literature search, but I'm willing to bet that the empirical evidence for social work licensure is slim to non-existant. The main arguments for licensure involve client protection, but are their studies that show that stricter licensure requirements are associated with fewer malpractice cases? I'm willing to bet there are not. I may even have to request this data.
Questions:
- Has anyone ever studied this before?
- What does data from other health professions say about licensure?
- What was the state of social work licensure before the ASWB model law?
- Would it be worth requesting this data, performing a regression, and publishing it?
3) Access to social work profession
The cost of getting a social work license is prohibitively high for individuals of low income. In order to start practicing independently, social workers must earn a masters degree, pass one or more licensing exams, and engage in supervised practice for 1-3 years (depending on the state). Masters degrees at state schools are at least in the tens of thousands of dollars. It's not like there are many endowed social work departments to offer scholarships and fellowships. The licensing process itself costs a few hundred dollars to process your paperwork. And clinical supervision is often an additional weekly cost over the course of 1-3 years (we've probably paid 7-8 thousand dollars). Finally, in order to maintain your license, you need to be able to pay for continuing education units throughout the year.
Questions:
- How much does social work licensure cost in each state?
- How much does an MSW cost, on average?
- How do these vary by state?
- How much does clinical supervision cost in each state?
- How much do CEUs cost on average? How do most social workers get their CEUs?
4) It fucks over the young
Social work licensure is a game that is dominated by existing practitioners. Given that social work licensure used to be far more laissez-faire and college tuition costs have risen exponentially, older social workers are less likely to have faced such steep costs when they became practitioners. Newer practitioners face steep costs that limit their ability to have enough capital to start their own businesses or form their own cooperatives. Instead, many recent graduates will work as part of large organizations of social workers and counselors under the supervision of a few more experienced practitioners. Older practitioners are also the individuals providing supervised practice and leading CEU courses and trainings for a considerable cost. Newer practitioners are forced to pay these individuals in order to credential themselves. Existing laws do not protect potential social workers, they protect existing social workers.
Questions:
- What were social work laws like prior to the 2000s?
- More of the cost stuff
- What is some theoretical literature that supports the idea that licensure laws impact newer competitors?
Monday, August 10, 2015
Mises and Objectivity (again)
Sorry, apparently, this blog is now just about epistemology?
Anyway, I'm continuing to read Human Action. Mises spends a lot of time trashing the German historical school, which isn't particularly relevant to the arguments of today since the historicists don't have a lot of contemporary antecedents. I absolutely loved his evisceration of homo economicus and the assumptions of the mainstream economic interpretation of classical economics. Nothing I hadn't heard, but well put.
My sticking point continues to be with Mises' episetmological framework. I appreciate that Human Action proceeds as it should--by starting from a philosophy of science framework and working downward to social theory. But Mises' arguments for the "objectivity" of praxeology are still either unconvincing or too confusing for me to understand. The comparison made in the study guide was that the Pythagorean theorem doesn't not need to be proven by measuring X number of triangles and concluding a posteriori that Pythagoras was correct. Similarly, praxeological statements about human action and economic laws are not subject to falsification a posteriori. They, like mathematical laws, derive their objective and universal truth from deductive logic (which Mises discusses as imperfect though good enough when subject to critical scrutiny) leading from humans act all the way to the laws of economics.
My question though is that how are economic laws equivalent to mathematical laws? How does a relationship between abstract quantities in math, a pure science, actually relate to economic laws which are necessarily bound to human experience. I'm not saying that a priori ideas cannot exist, but that the idea that these are universal for all individuals may not be true. Triangles do not act. Humans act. The necessarily subjective character of that action (which is the precis of Mises' school of economic thought) seems like it should make those two branches of scientific inquiry quite dissimilar. Furthermore, while a mathematician may be influenced by existing categorizations and understandings of how triangles behave, the degree to which individuals are influenced culturally about economic matters is in my estimation much greater. I don't receive much information in my development on how to calculate the area of triangles. Hell, I receive more information daily about economic matters than I have probably about triangles. I can get the ideal of wanting economic laws to be as true as mathemetical laws, but it seems damn near impossible since our perception of economic logic and reason is culturally determined. There would have to be too many damn asterisks after your knowledge claims.
It brings me back to something Mary Katherine once told me: "But it's still rat choice" [meaning rational choice]. I was trying to explain Austrian subjectivity theory to her, but it just all came out as rational choice. Every time I read Mises I feel the same way. He goes through a great critique of rational choice's idiotic assumptions about human nature, but then seeks to create the same universal, timeless, context-less laws that rational choice desires. Weird.
Anyway, I'm continuing to read Human Action. Mises spends a lot of time trashing the German historical school, which isn't particularly relevant to the arguments of today since the historicists don't have a lot of contemporary antecedents. I absolutely loved his evisceration of homo economicus and the assumptions of the mainstream economic interpretation of classical economics. Nothing I hadn't heard, but well put.
My sticking point continues to be with Mises' episetmological framework. I appreciate that Human Action proceeds as it should--by starting from a philosophy of science framework and working downward to social theory. But Mises' arguments for the "objectivity" of praxeology are still either unconvincing or too confusing for me to understand. The comparison made in the study guide was that the Pythagorean theorem doesn't not need to be proven by measuring X number of triangles and concluding a posteriori that Pythagoras was correct. Similarly, praxeological statements about human action and economic laws are not subject to falsification a posteriori. They, like mathematical laws, derive their objective and universal truth from deductive logic (which Mises discusses as imperfect though good enough when subject to critical scrutiny) leading from humans act all the way to the laws of economics.
My question though is that how are economic laws equivalent to mathematical laws? How does a relationship between abstract quantities in math, a pure science, actually relate to economic laws which are necessarily bound to human experience. I'm not saying that a priori ideas cannot exist, but that the idea that these are universal for all individuals may not be true. Triangles do not act. Humans act. The necessarily subjective character of that action (which is the precis of Mises' school of economic thought) seems like it should make those two branches of scientific inquiry quite dissimilar. Furthermore, while a mathematician may be influenced by existing categorizations and understandings of how triangles behave, the degree to which individuals are influenced culturally about economic matters is in my estimation much greater. I don't receive much information in my development on how to calculate the area of triangles. Hell, I receive more information daily about economic matters than I have probably about triangles. I can get the ideal of wanting economic laws to be as true as mathemetical laws, but it seems damn near impossible since our perception of economic logic and reason is culturally determined. There would have to be too many damn asterisks after your knowledge claims.
It brings me back to something Mary Katherine once told me: "But it's still rat choice" [meaning rational choice]. I was trying to explain Austrian subjectivity theory to her, but it just all came out as rational choice. Every time I read Mises I feel the same way. He goes through a great critique of rational choice's idiotic assumptions about human nature, but then seeks to create the same universal, timeless, context-less laws that rational choice desires. Weird.
Tuesday, July 7, 2015
Objectivity and Austrian Economics (praxeology)
I just started reading Human Action. It's been long overdue, and I'm liking it way more than I thought I would. The text is far more approachable than I had been lead to believe, and the ideas are actually easy to follow at this point. The study guide from the Mises Institute is quite helpful, as well.
In the first chapter, Mises states that the objectivity in Austrian economics lies in its inherent subjectivism. That is, by not judging the subjective valuations behind human action and instead treating them as given, Austrian economics keeps an objective view of the social world. I think that is an incredibly powerful but also incorrect statement.
It is indeed true that Austrian economics does treat subjective valuations as given. Austrian economics entails radical relativism and subjectivism with respect to what is a correct or true perception about the world. It is simply enough that the person acting presumes that an action will quell some uneasiness and that person will choose to act.
It's this lack of value judgment that endears Austrian economics to my approach to social work. Helping relationships emerge from a positive, supporting relationship with a nonjudgmental stance. This Rogerian humanism shares a great deal of fellow feeling with the Austrian economic worldview. They start without the presumption of knowledge, where the individual is the expert on their world, and do not judge the person for acting certain ways.
Mises, on a related note, also mentions that individuals experiencing mental health issues are similarly engaging in rational action, as having a faulty, incomplete, or idiosycratic valuation about exchanging these means for this end does not erase that a person acted. However, I believe Mises understandably errs when he addresses those diagnosed with intellectual or developmental disabilities. As our knowledge of this population has grown and assistive technologies gained greater effectiveness, it is certainly apparent that individuals with these disabilities also act and should not (time-related, but still relevant) uncharitably classified non-human.
In spite of these many strengths in the Misesean conception of human action, and the science of human action, Austrian economics (praxeology in the original text), Mises' notion of the objectivity of Austrian economics (lying in its subjectivity in analysis) is vulnerable and unsustainable in light of social scientific critique. In doing economic analysis, a praxeologist does not see the world naively, without aid from existing conceptions. Mises himself acknowledges this problem and terms it imperfect induction--an epiestomological issue in both natural and social sciences. But the praxeologist is by no means immune to this problem--a problem he may at some point later acknowledge or expand upon.
Relavitism is correct. Subjectivism is correct. But it is a problem that social science tends to change based on the experiences of the observer (supposedly objective in Mises' argument). That is, the existing categories a person necessarily brings to the social scientific endeavor are indelibly imprinted within the truth he or she settles upon. There is no neutral observer. This is an epistemological problem as old as the Enlightenment and David Hume, and it is striking to me that Mises does not acknowledge that philosophical problem (at least, not yet).
Roderick Long has an excellent video I had to track down on this very sticky problem (I might find it and post it to this later). In it, he cites a Hayek paper on the facts of the social sciences (again, I forget which one) which supports this objection to Mises' worldview. Long states that Mises agreed with Hayek's paper but left open the question of how either theorist would resolve that inconsistency in their social theory.
I had long thought the debate was a different one. I thought that it was Mises' insistence that rationality was an objective truth that was the epistemological break between the two theorists. In reality, both allow for (indeed, call for) a socially constructed reality that impacts human action. And Mises' tautology that all action is rational isn't a proof--it's a definition of what action is and is not. It is the position of the social scientist--the subject of my favorite Hayek work, The Counter-Revolution of Science--that is the departure point between the two.
The unsustainability of Mises' conception of the objective observer is manifest from even the most average of any writer from the feminist, queer, race, or other critical theory on even their worst day. That knowledge creation and truth-seeking are socially constructed endeavors should not be a surprise to the Austrian economist. Those socially constructed forces, after all, impact all of human action.
In the first chapter, Mises states that the objectivity in Austrian economics lies in its inherent subjectivism. That is, by not judging the subjective valuations behind human action and instead treating them as given, Austrian economics keeps an objective view of the social world. I think that is an incredibly powerful but also incorrect statement.
It is indeed true that Austrian economics does treat subjective valuations as given. Austrian economics entails radical relativism and subjectivism with respect to what is a correct or true perception about the world. It is simply enough that the person acting presumes that an action will quell some uneasiness and that person will choose to act.
It's this lack of value judgment that endears Austrian economics to my approach to social work. Helping relationships emerge from a positive, supporting relationship with a nonjudgmental stance. This Rogerian humanism shares a great deal of fellow feeling with the Austrian economic worldview. They start without the presumption of knowledge, where the individual is the expert on their world, and do not judge the person for acting certain ways.
Mises, on a related note, also mentions that individuals experiencing mental health issues are similarly engaging in rational action, as having a faulty, incomplete, or idiosycratic valuation about exchanging these means for this end does not erase that a person acted. However, I believe Mises understandably errs when he addresses those diagnosed with intellectual or developmental disabilities. As our knowledge of this population has grown and assistive technologies gained greater effectiveness, it is certainly apparent that individuals with these disabilities also act and should not (time-related, but still relevant) uncharitably classified non-human.
In spite of these many strengths in the Misesean conception of human action, and the science of human action, Austrian economics (praxeology in the original text), Mises' notion of the objectivity of Austrian economics (lying in its subjectivity in analysis) is vulnerable and unsustainable in light of social scientific critique. In doing economic analysis, a praxeologist does not see the world naively, without aid from existing conceptions. Mises himself acknowledges this problem and terms it imperfect induction--an epiestomological issue in both natural and social sciences. But the praxeologist is by no means immune to this problem--a problem he may at some point later acknowledge or expand upon.
Relavitism is correct. Subjectivism is correct. But it is a problem that social science tends to change based on the experiences of the observer (supposedly objective in Mises' argument). That is, the existing categories a person necessarily brings to the social scientific endeavor are indelibly imprinted within the truth he or she settles upon. There is no neutral observer. This is an epistemological problem as old as the Enlightenment and David Hume, and it is striking to me that Mises does not acknowledge that philosophical problem (at least, not yet).
Roderick Long has an excellent video I had to track down on this very sticky problem (I might find it and post it to this later). In it, he cites a Hayek paper on the facts of the social sciences (again, I forget which one) which supports this objection to Mises' worldview. Long states that Mises agreed with Hayek's paper but left open the question of how either theorist would resolve that inconsistency in their social theory.
I had long thought the debate was a different one. I thought that it was Mises' insistence that rationality was an objective truth that was the epistemological break between the two theorists. In reality, both allow for (indeed, call for) a socially constructed reality that impacts human action. And Mises' tautology that all action is rational isn't a proof--it's a definition of what action is and is not. It is the position of the social scientist--the subject of my favorite Hayek work, The Counter-Revolution of Science--that is the departure point between the two.
The unsustainability of Mises' conception of the objective observer is manifest from even the most average of any writer from the feminist, queer, race, or other critical theory on even their worst day. That knowledge creation and truth-seeking are socially constructed endeavors should not be a surprise to the Austrian economist. Those socially constructed forces, after all, impact all of human action.
Wednesday, June 24, 2015
Thick Libertarianism and Social Work Values and Ethics
I had intended for this to be a short comparison between the two topics, but given that I would have to wade through a lengthy Charles Johnson piece, I'm content to just gloss over surface level analysis here. In fact, I believe the point of this post should probably be to sketch out social work values and ethics and how they might contribute to a "thickening" of libertarian value commitments (then compare those at a later date to the already explicated versions by Johnson, Long, and others).
Thick libertarianism, as was mentioned in the previous post, is the idea that a value commitment to personal liberty does not stop on the steps of government. Opposing oppression in whatever form is a necessary commitment for libertarians because it inhibits the individual from expressing who they truly are or experiencing things that might be important to them. For example, anti-drug warriors are wrong not only because a person should have the right to seek whatever oblivion they desire but because both the state (who enforces their preferences as gunpoint) and conservative society (which enforces their preferences through drug testing entry-level workers, for example Dish Network's recent case in Colorado) are inhibiting a person from being and expressing their true desires. The mulitiplicity, heterogeneity, and sponteneity that is entailed in free human action is the central value commitment I see in a thicker conception of libertarianism.
Thickness also bring along other ideas from anti-racism, anti-sexism, and all the other isms in that its critique of the social structure (aside from the state) requires additional theoretical and philosophical work that is best explored through a critical theory lens towards society. For a long time, I have been trying to marry my philosophical commitments to libertarianism with my values in social work. As I've gone through my PhD education, this marriage has gotten a lot easier to work through. Of the social work values (service, social justice, dignity and worth of the person, importance of human relationships, integrity, and competence), many have helped me understand in practice what a thick libertarian commitment might entail.
For example, the ideal of service makes sense not as a mandate or a necessary part of libertarianism but as a natural extension of battling social oppression. Volunteering at burns in the harm reduction center allows me to use my therapeutic skills while also doing triage in the war on drugs. Additionally, the anti-oppressive interventions suggested by thick libertarian ideas--that is, polycentric, consensual, but participatory action--fit well with the social work values of service, social justice, and the importance of human relationships. Furthermore, these bottom-up interventions are more likely to respect the dignity and worth of the individual and respect their right to self-determination.
This is a bit rushed, but I'm trying to meet a deadline. I have to read Johnson and Long. Maybe I'll do a short reaction post on each the next few days.
Thick libertarianism, as was mentioned in the previous post, is the idea that a value commitment to personal liberty does not stop on the steps of government. Opposing oppression in whatever form is a necessary commitment for libertarians because it inhibits the individual from expressing who they truly are or experiencing things that might be important to them. For example, anti-drug warriors are wrong not only because a person should have the right to seek whatever oblivion they desire but because both the state (who enforces their preferences as gunpoint) and conservative society (which enforces their preferences through drug testing entry-level workers, for example Dish Network's recent case in Colorado) are inhibiting a person from being and expressing their true desires. The mulitiplicity, heterogeneity, and sponteneity that is entailed in free human action is the central value commitment I see in a thicker conception of libertarianism.
Thickness also bring along other ideas from anti-racism, anti-sexism, and all the other isms in that its critique of the social structure (aside from the state) requires additional theoretical and philosophical work that is best explored through a critical theory lens towards society. For a long time, I have been trying to marry my philosophical commitments to libertarianism with my values in social work. As I've gone through my PhD education, this marriage has gotten a lot easier to work through. Of the social work values (service, social justice, dignity and worth of the person, importance of human relationships, integrity, and competence), many have helped me understand in practice what a thick libertarian commitment might entail.
For example, the ideal of service makes sense not as a mandate or a necessary part of libertarianism but as a natural extension of battling social oppression. Volunteering at burns in the harm reduction center allows me to use my therapeutic skills while also doing triage in the war on drugs. Additionally, the anti-oppressive interventions suggested by thick libertarian ideas--that is, polycentric, consensual, but participatory action--fit well with the social work values of service, social justice, and the importance of human relationships. Furthermore, these bottom-up interventions are more likely to respect the dignity and worth of the individual and respect their right to self-determination.
This is a bit rushed, but I'm trying to meet a deadline. I have to read Johnson and Long. Maybe I'll do a short reaction post on each the next few days.
Tuesday, June 23, 2015
Thick and Thin Libertarianism
This short post cannot really do justice to the ideas within this debate in the libertarian world, but as that world is likely not known to many, I'll summarize the arguments about it. Thin libertarianism is the general, popular image of libertarianism. It's one where the prior concern for liberty is expressed through hostility towards oppression generated by governments. To the extent that these arguments align with more traditionally leftist arguments, be they about the racist drug war, eminent domain, etc., libertarians are often viewed as somewhat more enlightened about oppression than those on the traditional right. Thin libertarianism advocates for anarchism or minimalist government on the grounds that government is inherently oppressive to all individuals, regardless of social standing.
Thick libertarian arguments, on the other hand, posit that the libertarian commitment to opposing oppression and promoting individual liberty extends beyond a critique of government. The social structures that repress the individual's ability to reach their own potential, usually traditional social rules and organizations, are just as problematic as the government itself--if not moreso. Thick libertarianism advocates for causes related to racism, sexism, transsexism, etc. because they constrain the ability of individuals to self-actualize, to build communities of mutual respect and love. When thick and thin libertarians agree on political issues (like the drug war, overcriminalization, etc.), thick libertarians are often more apt to cite the experiences of marginalized groups, in particular using their voices to explain in their own words how oppression impacts their lives.
Thick libertarianism is quite attractive for a social worker. In analyzing a political issue, you are able to use the incisive structural critique of Austrian and Public Choice political economy to understand the problems with involving centrally planned solutions to social problems. At the same time, it allows you the flexibility to make arguments rooted in the shared experiences of oppressed populations that are persuasive to people to ascribe to some form of social justice.
I bring up this issue because of the fantastic Center for a Stateless Society study on gender identity. In addition to providing an excellent background to the oppression faced daily by people identifying as trans, it makes the compelling (though under-supported claim) that freed gender identity is necessarily a libertarian issue. The author tends to assume away thin libertarian objections with too little argumentation and rhetorical support, but her conclusion, I believe is valid for thick libertarians. If you find fellow-feeling with social justice but base that within an individualistic (not atomistic!) framework, freed gender identity should be a major issue. Moreover, it provides a blueprint based on Charles Johnson's work for how to countermand the malign spontaneous order of trans oppression--consciously planned, emergent, and consensual social change based on the local level. The rape crisis centers, drop-in centers, women's centers, and other feminist-inspired support networks become to people of diversity gender identity the trans shelters, clubs, centers, and networks.
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